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I. INTRODUCTION
The employment law arena has been one of fertile ground for the

United States Supreme Court in its most recent terms. The Supreme
Court has actively interpreted employer and employee rights and
obligations with respect to employment relations. As a result, employee
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employer prerogatives are in the balance. During this period, the
Supreme Court has affirmed the trend toward utilizing arbitration to
settle disputes concerning the employment relationship. The result has
been that arbitration is increasing in both scope and reach. Conversely,
recent United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"),' which sought to
expand employment protections for individuals with disabilities, reflects
a pendulum swing in the other direction. Specifically, recent United
States Supreme Court decisions have limited the scope and application
of the ADA. The scope of both the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 ("ADEA") 2 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 3 have also
been limited by recent United States Supreme Court decisions.
Moreover, the Supreme Court decided a case in its 2002 term in which
Nevada unsuccessfully attempted to limit the applicability of the Family
Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") 4 to the states. 5 Last, the future of
affirmative action was the subject of a pair of consolidated cases before
the Supreme Court in 2003. In these cases, the court decided whether the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of race in the admission of
students to a university, or whether diversity can provide a compelling
government interest sufficient to meet the Fourteenth Amendment
standard followed by the courts. 6 Ultimately, these decisions will affect
the future of affirmative action not only in higher education, but also in
the employment arena.
This article explores recent developments in the areas of arbitration
in employment disputes and the scope and reach of the ADA. Also,
included is a brief discussion of the recently decided cases regarding
affirmative action, as those decisions may have an impact on the future
of employment relations.
II. ARBITRATION
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 7 addresses the validity and
enforceability of arbitration agreements in employment contracts. Its

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2001).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2000).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
5. Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).
6. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000). Chapter 1, section 14 of the FAA applies to contracts made on
or after January 1, 1926.
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purpose is twofold; (1) it makes arbitration agreements in cases
involving interstate commerce or maritime law as enforceable as other
contracts and (2) it makes the arbitration procedure, "when selected by
the parties to a contract,8 [] speedy and not subject to delay and
obstruction in the courts.",
Since the purpose of the FAA is "to place arbitration agreements on
equal footing with other contracts," 9 duties to enforce arbitration
agreements are not diminished when a party, bound by the agreement,
raises a claim based on statutory rights, unless there is a well-founded
claim that such agreement resulted from any grounds that would
otherwise invalidate a contract.' 0 Similarly, the duty to arbitrate can be
overridden by specific contrary Congressional command, but the burden
is on the party opposed to arbitration to prove that Congress intended to
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."
American courts have consistently enforced arbitration provisions
in employment agreements pursuant to the FAA, so long as the
employee is not in an excluded class such as seamen or transportation
workers involved in interstate commerce.12 Courts have narrowly
defined the excluded groups as those "directly engaged in the channels
of interstate commerce, i.e. workers employed in the transportation
industries."' 3
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court held in Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., that employment contracts compelling
arbitration of all claims arising out of employment, including claims for
violation of the ADEA, are enforceable.' 4 The Court determined that the
8. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404, 405-06 (1967)
(holding that arbitrators could decide a claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract in an
agreement that contained an arbitration clause covering any controversy or claim relating to the
agent); see also Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 2037 (2003); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
9. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293 (2002) (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd.
of Trs. of Leland Standford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
10. Id. at 289-90 ("[T]he FAA's proarbitration policy does not operate without regard to the
wishes of the contracting parties." (citing Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S.
52, 57 (1995))).
11. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
12. See Tonetti v. Shirley, 219 Cal. Rptr. 616, 618 (4th Dist. 1985). (holding that a
stockbroker is not exempted from the FAA under section 1, but that only seamen, railroad
employees and those workers employed in the transportation industries are exempted pursuant to 9
U.S.C. § 1);see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Saint Clair Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118-19 (2001)
(holding that the language of 9 U.S.C. § I was not open to the broad interpretation put forth by the
lower court, rather § I was limited to transportation workers).
13. Tonetti, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 618 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 1).
14. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. In Gilmer, a financial services manager was required to register as
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FAA establishes a strong federal policy favoring arbitration to enforce
private contractual rights.15 During its past three terms, the United States
Supreme Court has analyzed and expanded the relationship of the FAA
to a variety of contracts, including employment agreements. 16 In its
examination of the these relationships, the Supreme Court addressed the
scope of the FAA, the extent to which parties can be bound by the FAA,
and substantive issues of subject agreements. 17
In the 2000-2001 term, the Court decided Circuit City Stores, Inc.
v. Adams' 8 and reviewed to what .extent, if any, the FAA applies to
contracts of employment.' 9 The lower court ordered arbitration pursuant
a securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange. Id. The registration application
included an arbitration clause wherein he agreed to arbitrate any disputes between himself and his
employer arising out of his employment or a term of his employment. Id. at 23. When the plaintiff
was terminated seven years later, he brought suit alleging a violation of the ADEA. Id. at 23. The
employer filed a motion to compel arbitration. Id. at 24. The district court denied the employer's
motion, ruling that arbitration procedures were inadequate for final resolution of rights created by
the ADEA and that Congress had intended to protect the ADEA plaintiffs from waiver of their
rights to a judicial forum. Id. at 24. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the agreement as
enforceable when ADEA issues were alleged. Id. The United States Supreme Court found that
Gilmer did not meet his "burden of showing that Congress... intended to preclude arbitration" of
ADEA claims, and thus affirmed the 4th Circuit. Id. at 35.
15. Id. at 24. The Court stated that the purpose of the FAA "was to reverse the longstanding
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common law and had been
adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other
contracts." Id.
16. See generally, EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (stating that arbitration
clauses in employment contracts do not preclude the EEOC from pursuing remedies authorized by
statute); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (reversing the lower court and
limiting the exemptions found in Section 1 of the FAA to most employment agreements of
transportation workers), Green Tree Fin. Corp., v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (finding that
the trial court's decision ordering the arbitration was final for purposes of the FAA; the lower court
erred when it determined that the arbitration clause, which was silent as to costs and fees, was
unenforceable; and that the consumer failed to meet its burden of showing that arbitration would be
prohibitively expensive).
17. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 279; Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 105; Green Tree
Fin. Corp., 531 U.S. at 79.
18. 532 U.S. at 105.
19. Id. at 109. In this case, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
whether the FAA applies to all contracts of employment. Id Here, the employee claimed he was
discriminated against and harassed by his employer based on his sexual orientation. See Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, No. C98-0365CAL, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62155, at * 5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29,
1998). The employee asserted that the arbitration agreement he signed was a contract of adhesion,
therefore unconscionable and unenforceable since the agreement limited his recovery. Id. at *7. The
district court held that the limitations on recovery did not amount to the "extreme one-sidedness [3
required for a finding of unconscionability as a matter of law .
Id. The district court ordered
I..."
arbitration pursuant to the dispute resolution agreement. Id. at *7. On remand, the Ninth Circuit held
that the Dispute Resolution Agreement "is an unconscionable contract of adhesion under California
law" and reversed the order compelling arbitration. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d
889, 896 (9th Cir. 2002).
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to the dispute resolution agreement that -the employee signed, but the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the
FAA did not apply to employment contracts. 20 The Ninth Circuit's
decision was reversed by the United States Supreme Court, which
definitively stated that the FAA applies to contracts of employment, and
that only employment contracts of transportation workers are exempt.2'
This case clarified and solidified the application of the FAA to
employment contracts in general.
In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph,22 decided in
December of 2000, the United States Supreme Court held that an
agreement to arbitrate under the FAA was enforceable despite the fact
that it did not specify who bore the costs of arbitration.2 3 The Court
indicated that a party who resists arbitration, due to claims of steep
arbitration costs, bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring
the costs and that their claims are unsuitable for arbitration.24
In the 2001-2002 term, the United States Supreme Court decided
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. 25 In that case, the Court held that an

agreement between an employer and an employee to arbitrate
employment-related disputes does not bar the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") from pursuing victim-specific
judicial relief, such as back-pay, reinstatement and money damages, in
an ADA based suit. 26 In Waffle House, the employer contended that the

EEOC was also bound by the arbitration agreement between Waffle
House and the employee.27 The United States Supreme Court determined
20. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 1999).
21. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. at 109. Section 1 of the FAA excludes
"contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The Court addressed the exclusion by holding
that the congressional decision to exempt these workers from the FAA was due to "Congress'
undoubted authority to govern the employment relationships at issue by the enactment of statutes
specific to them." Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 121.
22. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
23. See id at 91-92. Here the plaintiff was the purchaser of a mobile home, who claimed that
the petitioners violated the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601. Id. at 82-83. The agreement with
the financial institutions required the buyer to purchase insurance protecting lenders from the costs
of default and stated that all disputes were to be resolved by binding arbitration. Id. at 82-83. The
agreement was silent as to the apportionment of the arbitration costs and fees. Id. at 84.
24. Id. at 91-92.
25. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
26. Id. at 279, 294, 295, 297, 298. The employee was not a party to the EEOC claim. Id. at
283.
27. The employee alleged claims under the ADA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., No. 3:96-2739-0, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23245, at **1-2 (D. S.C. Mar. 24, 1998). The United States District Court of South Carolina
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that despite a strong policy favoring the FAA, "nothing in the statute
authorizes a court to compel arbitration of any issues, or by any parties,
that are not already covered in the agreement., 28 Furthermore, the Court
noted that "[t]he FAA does not mention enforcement by public agencies;
it ensures the enforceability of private agreements to arbitrate, but
otherwise does not purport to place any restriction on a nonparty's
choice of a judicial forum., 29 The Court recognized the ability of an
employer and an employee to bind themselves to an arbitration
agreement, but not the ability to bind a federal agency that oversees the
rights and interests of the public.3 °
Subsequent to the 2002 term, the American courts have continued
to review cases that question the applicability and adequacy of the FAA.
In Mercuro v. Superior Court,3 1 the plaintiff sought to have the
arbitration agreement rendered invalid on the basis that it was
unconscionable. 32 The California Court of Appeals for the Second
District held that in order to determine if an arbitration agreement is
unconscionable, both procedural and substantive elements must be
denied the employer's motion to compel arbitration because the employment application and job
offer were both oral. Id. at *6. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with the issue of
"whether, and to what extent the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), in
prosecuting a suit in its own name, is bound by a private arbitration agreement between the charging
party and his employer." EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 806 (4th Cir. 1999). The
Fourth Circuit held that the EEOC is not bound by the private arbitration agreement when seeking
broad-based injunctive relief in the public interest, but it is precluded from seeking "make-whole"
relief in a judicial forum. Id. at 807. For an analysis on whether arbitration provides an adequate
remedy to Title VII discrimination claimants, see Sarah Johnston, ADR in the Employment
DiscriminationContext: Friendor Foe to Claimants,22 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 335, 374-80
(Spring 2001).

28. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 289.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (2002). In Mercuro, the court held that an arbitration agreement
provision for fee sharing of arbitrator's fees prevented plaintiff from having an adequate opportunity
to vindicate his unwaivable statutory rights and created a chilling effect. Id. at 681-82 (citing
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 681 (Cal. 2000)).
32. Id. at 675. Upon employment, the employee signed a National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) form U-4 in which he agreed to arbitrate covered disputes between himself and his
employer in accordance with the NASD. Id. at 674. One year later, plaintiff-employee signed a
contract with defendant in which he agreed to arbitrate employment related disputes including
discrimination, but excluded other claims and injunctive relief for unfair competition, unauthorized
disclosure of trade secrets or violation of intellectual property rights. Id. Plaintiff was offered
consideration of one vacation day or twenty-five shares of stock. Id. Plaintiff claimed he only signed
the agreement because he was coerced and under duress. Id. at 675. Plaintiff subsequently quit and
filed suit against his employer claiming age and disability discrimination, fraud and wrongful
termination in violation of public policy. Id. at 673. The trial court granted defendant-employer's
motion to compel arbitration. Id. at 675.
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reviewed.33 The procedural elements look to the adhesiveness of the
arbitration agreement and whether the weaker party was presented with a
"take it or leave it" contract drafted by the stronger party. 34 Ostensibly,
the court looks to the "oppressiveness of the stronger party's conduct. 35
The substantive element looks at the terms of the contract itself to
determine whether the contract fails to guarantee a neutral arbitrator and
whether the contract is unfairly one-sided, such as where claims of the
employee are subject to arbitration, while some or all of the claims of the
employer are exempt from it. 36 The court found that the arbitration
agreement between the employee and Countrywide was "permeated with
The court held that the "threats
unconscionability and illegality....
and cajoling" used to convince the employee to sign the arbitration
agreement, "together with the lack of mutuality as to arbitrable claims,
the unlawful fee-sharing provision and the disadvantages to the
employee in using NAF [National Arbitration Forum] as the arbitrator,"
all combined to "create an 'inferior3 8forum' for the employee that
work[ed] to the employer's advantage.
In Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases,39 an employee of Scott argued that
the arbitration clause of her employment agreement violated public
policy because it required her to pay one-half the arbitrator's fees. 40 The
District Court rejected Blair's argument; however, the Third Circuit
noted that arbitration agreements should be liberally enforced, but
"arbitration is only appropriate 'so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum. '41 The court stated, "arbitration costs are directly related

33. Id.at 675-76 (relying on the California Supreme Court decision in Armendariz v. Found.
Health Psychcare Services, Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (2000)).
34. Id. at 676.
35. See Id.; see also Griffin v. Semperit of Am., Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (S.D. Tex.
1976) (determining that the FAA "creates a basis for federal substantive law under the commerce
clause..." and that the "courts must therefore look to federal common law for interpretation of the
arbitration agreement .... ) (construing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.

395, 405 (1967)).
36. Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676.
37. Id. at 684.
38. Id. The court noted a "repeat player effect" is created when there are limited numbers of
eligible arbitrators to hear a particular issue through the NAF program. Id. at 678. An employer who
would likely be using the services of the same arbitrators on a more regular basis than employees
could gain some benefit from repeat use. Id. at 678-79.
39. 283 F.3d 595 (3d Cir. 2002).
40. Id. at 597.
41. Id. at 605 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991))
(alteration in original).
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to a litigant's ability to pursue the claim. 4 2 Blair also relied on Green
Tree FinancialCorp.-Alabama, where the United States Supreme Court
"acknowledged that 'the existence of large arbitration costs could
preclude a litigant ... from effectively vindicating her federal statutory
rights in the arbitral forum. ,,,43
In Green Tree FinancialCorp.-Alabama,
the Court found that the party initially resisting arbitration has the
burden of proof to show that arbitration would be prohibitively
expensive." Relying on these principles, the Third Circuit in Blair
ordered limited discovery regarding the costs of arbitration and
plaintiffs financial capacity in order to determine whether arbitration is
a forum in which plaintiff can vindicate her rights.4 5 The court also
provided the employer with "the opportunity to meet its burden to prove
that the costs will not be prohibitively expensive, or ...offer to pay all
of the arbitrator's fees." 46
As courts continue to validate the FAA and the broad scope of its
applicability, the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") has
developed guidelines for employers and employees seeking to resolve
their employment related disputes.4 7 These rules attempt to "ensure
fairness and equity in resolving workplace disputes. 48 As previously
discussed, fees can often be the determining factor in whether an
employee seeks arbitration of a dispute with an employer.4 9 While
arbitration is viewed as a faster and more efficient means to settle
employment disputes, 50 the fees associated with arbitration can be most
42. Id.at 605.
43. Id. at 605 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)).
44. Id. at 607 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama, 531 U.S. at 91). In Green Tree
Financial Corp.-Alabama, the plaintiff could not meet this burden because the plaintiff did not
present evidence "to show she would 'be saddled with prohibitive costs."' Id.at 607.
45. Id.at610.
46. Id.
47. American Arbitration Association, National Rules for the Resolution of Employment
Disputes (effective January 1, 2004), availableat http://www.adr.org. (last visited Jan. 4, 2003).
48. Id.
49. Blair,283 F.3d at 609. In Blair, the court found that
[t]he appropriate inquiry is one that evaluates whether the arbitral forum in a particular
case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, i.e., a case-by-case analysis
that focuses, among other things, upon the claimant's ability to pay the arbitration fees
and costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and
whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims.
Id. (quoting Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys. Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001)).
Bradford did not meet this test because he "initiated arbitration before litigation and proceeded
through a full arbitration hearing on the merits of his claim, demonstrating conclusively that he was
not deterred from entering into arbitration." Id. The court also found that Bradford earned a salary
of $l 15,000 plus yearly bonuses prior to his discharge. Id.
50. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d
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prohibitive to certain types of employees, such as a factory worker, who
would otherwise be able to file a lawsuit represented by counsel on a
contingency basis while suffering no out-of-pocket expenses.
Conversely, the impact of the fees associated with arbitration upon a
large employer is minimal, as it can easily assume the expenses. 1
Even though arbitration is itself a method by which parties can seek
an efficient and cost effective adjudication of issues, the AAA provides
expedited employment arbitration procedures in response to parties'
concerns about rising costs and delays of litigation. Specifically, rules
effectuated by the AAA focus on the fee structure of agreements that are
employer-promulgated, as well as those that are individually
negotiated.5 2 In agreements promulgated by the employer, employees
only need to pay a filing fee to the AAA of $125, whereas the employer
may be required to pay up to $1,375 for filing fees in addition to the
entire remaining costs of the arbitration, including arbitrator
compensation. 3 Employers are spared the full weight of the fees only if
it is found that the employee brought a frivolous or harassing claim. 54 If
the agreement containing the arbitration provision was negotiated
between an employee and employer, a filing fee is paid by the filing
party and fees are ultimately subject to allocation by the arbitrator in the
award.55
Fees have been added to the selection process of arbitrators since
parties began requesting several lists of multi-panel arbitrators.56 This
may be an indicator that employers and employees are looking to
broaden the scope of eligible arbitrators for a particular issue.57 This
action seems to indicate that parties to an arbitration proceeding are
195, 196 (4th Cir. 1990), afid, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
51. See Blair, 283 F.3d at 610. In Blair, the court ordered a remand and
[l]imited discovery into the rates charged by the AAA and the approximate length of
similar arbitration proceedings [so that the plaintiff could have the opportunity to]
adequately establish the costs of arbitration, and give Blair the opportunity to prove, as
required under Green Tree, that resort to arbitration would deny her a forum to vindicate
her statutory rights.
Id. at 610. The employer was also "given the opportunity to meet its burden to prove that arbitration
[would] not be prohibitively expensive, or as has been suggested in other cases, offer to pay all of
the arbitrator's fees." Id. The court believed this would level the playing field as related to expenses.
Id. at 610.
52. American Arbitration Association, National Rules for the Resolution of Employment
Disputes (effective January 1, 2004), available at http://www.adr.org. (last visited Jan. 4, 2003).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. Either the employer or the employee can pay more if the agreement so provides. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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seeking to void the appearance of repeat player advantage,5 8 and are
looking to ensure that the arbitration is effective. 9
In addition to the potentially prohibitively expensive nature of
arbitration costs, fundamental issues relating to the adhesive nature of
mandatory dispute resolution still arise. The cases that followed the
implementation of the FAA broadened the scope of persons who are
bound by arbitration clauses within employment contracts, absent
contractual defenses such as duress, fraud or undue influence. The very
notion of arbitration clauses within certain employment contracts
insinuates a "take it or leave it" approach. A prospective employee, who
will be joining the workforce, certainly does not have the ability to
negotiate many, if any, terms of his or her employment. As such, the
arbitration clause of the employment contract or agreement can be seen
as proforma. Perhaps in employment contracts for professional services,
such as the financial industry, one could presume a higher bargaining
position for the financial professional versus the union laborer. Courts
have consistently upheld arbitration clauses in financial services
contracts where it seems likely that an educated professional would have
the appropriate bargaining power to overcome a presumed "take it or
leave it" contract. 60 Specifically, courts have found that such elements of
58. Fee arrangements such as these provide the employee with a basis for showing that
arbitration is prohibitively expensive. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolf, 531 U.S. 79,
96 (2000) (5-4 decision) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) (stating that "[a]s a repeat player in the
arbitration required by its form contract, Green Tree has superior information about the cost to
consumers of pursuing arbitration"); see also Mercuro v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 671, 678-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the employer's repeated appearance "before
the same group of arbitrators conveys distinct advantages over the individual employee," including
"knowledge of the arbitrators' temperaments, procedural preferences, styles and the like and the
arbitrators' cultivation of further business by taking a 'split the difference' approach to damages").
The Mercuro court also acknowledged that "[v]arious studies show that arbitration is advantageous
to employers ... because it reduces the size of the award that the employee is likely to get,
particularly if the employer is a 'repeat player' in the arbitration system." Mercuro, 116 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 679 (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000)).
59. Courts have addressed parties' claims of biased arbitration panels by applying various
levels of scrutiny. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991) ("We
decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be
unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators." (quoting
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985))). The Gilmer
court noted that "[t]he FAA also protects against bias, by providing that courts may overturn
arbitration decisions '[wihere there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators."' Id.
(citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(b)).
60. The Gilmer court also addressed unequal bargaining power, wherein it stated that "[m]ere
inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration
agreements are never enforceable in the employment context." Id. at 33. Thus, "arbitration
agreements are enforceable 'save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract."' Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2). However, the Supreme Court, in referring to Mitsubishi,
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employment contracts do not constitute contracts of adhesion, that could
otherwise invalidate such terms or the contract in its entirety.61
In Tupper v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp.,62 two aggrieved
employees filed wrongful termination suits claiming that there was no
consideration bargained for when they accepted the terms of arbitration
63
to resolve employee disputes. One party also alleged coercion and that
the arbitration agreement limited statutory remedies that may otherwise
be available to the employees.64 The employer relied upon the fact that
the employees had signed an Employee Dispute Resolution Procedure
Agreement which provided that all disputes were to be resolved through
arbitration.6 5 In fact, the Tupper court held that the consideration
supporting the agreement was the mutually agreed upon promise to
submit any disputes to arbitration.66 The suits were dismissed and
arbitration compelled.67 The court enunciated a strong presumption in
favor of arbitration and required that the objecting party provide strong
evidence that the party compelling arbitration waived its right to
arbitration.6 8
In Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc.,69 employees filed suit against their
employment agency for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA")7 ° and West Virginia state statutes relating to unpaid wages for
travel time, call time, training and overtime. 7' The district court ruled
that these claims must be resolved through arbitration, as the elements of
the contract included arbitration clauses and the contract was not

notes that, "courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate
resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds 'for
the revocation of any contract."' Id (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)). "As with the claimed procedural inadequacies... [the] claim of
unequal bargaining power is best left for resolution in specific cases." Id.
61. See, e.g., id; Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 627.
62. 186 F. Supp. 2d 981 (2002).
63. Id. at 985-86.
64. Id. at 986.
65. Id. at 984.
66. Id. at 988; see also Blair, 238 F.3d at 603 (finding that the consideration for agreeing to
arbitrate was in fact the employment opportunity itself).
67. Tupper, 186 F. Supp. 2d at 993.
68. Id at 990-91; see also Carlton J. Snow, Collective Agreements and Individual Contracts
Employment in Labor Law, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 319, 321 (2002) (discussing a proposed bill in the
House of Representatives, H.R. 2282: Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act, which would
amend the FAA to require arbitration only if both parties voluntarily consent after a statutory claim

has arisen).
69.
70.
71.

185 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D. W. Va. 2001), aff'd, 303 F.3d 496(4th Cir. 2002).
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-262 (2001).
Adkins, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 631.
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unconscionable.7 2 When the plaintiffs moved to join the customers of
Labor Ready as defendants, the court denied that motion on procedural
grounds, but found that since the claims could not be separated from
those against Labor Ready, those too could be resolved through
arbitration. 3 Significantly, the court, after mentioning that employees
signed a release of claims against Labor Ready's customers, did not
explore the validity of those releases.74 The customers of Labor Ready
could seemingly be relieved of liability if the releases could be used as a
contractual defense for the customers.75
After Adkins, the question of whether an employee or contracted
third party can waive their own bargaining power relative to an
arbitration clause seems to remain open. Effectively, to gain a more
favorable position, contractors may provide form contracts in which
subcontractors accept terms that may not be advantageous to their own
position. The district court added that, unless the terms rise to the levels
of "gross inadequacy in bargaining power" and "terms unreasonably
favorable to the stronger party," a finding of unconscionability could not
be made.76
On April 7, 2003, the United States Supreme Court decided
PacifiCareHealth Systems, Inc. v. Book,77 in which physicians alleged
that insurers delayed or denied payment per contract agreement and
violations of Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organization Act
("RICO").

78

The physicians challenged arbitration provisions in their

contracts on the basis that if they submit their disputes to arbitration,
punitive damages would be waived. 79 The Eleventh Circuit Court of
72. Id. at 636-37.
73. Id. at 640-41.
74. Id.at631
75. Id. at 641.
76. Id at 636. The court rejected employee-plaintiffs argument that he would suffer financial
hardship as he produced no evidence to substantiate the claim. Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303
F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir. 2002). This analysis caused the court to reject the position of the courts in
Giordano v. Pep Boy-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc., No. 99-1281, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5433 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 29, 2001) and Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 n.6 (2000) wherein
arbitration fees and costs can be grounds to consider the agreement unconscionable based on
specific cost-sharing provisions. Id.
77. 123 S. Ct. 1531 (2003), rev'g and remandingIn re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285
F.3d 971 (1 1th Cir. 2002). On remand, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded this case to the
District Court with instructions for additional proceedings in accordance with PacifiCareHealth
Sys., Inc. In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 333 F.3d 1247, 1248 (11 th Cir. 2003).
78. PaeifCareHealthSys.,Inc., 123 S. Ct. at 1531, 1533; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2003).
79. In re Managed Care Litig., 132 F. Supp. 2d 989, 997, 998, 1005 (S.D. Fla. 2000), aff d, In
re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971 (11 th Cir. 2002), rev'd PacifiCareHealth Sys.,
Inc., 123 S. Ct. at 1536.
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Appeals agreed, holding the agreements were unenforceable because
punitive damages, available under RICO, were excluded by the
arbitration provisions. 80 The United States Supreme Court reversed and
upheld the arbitration agreement on the basis that the uncertainty of
whether an arbitrator would award punitive damages was not enough to
void arbitration agreements.81
Looking to the future, employees will have few grounds upon
which to challenge an arbitration agreement. The United States Supreme
Court, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., held that the
provisions of the FAA, "manifest[] a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration"8 2 and that "generalized attacks on arbitration 'res[t] on
suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections
afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants,' and as such,
they are 'far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the
federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes.', 83 Likewise,
the Court held that "'questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.', 84 However,
from Gilmer through recent district and circuit court decisions,85 there
appears to be a trend of common law claims, such as unconscionability,
upon which an employee could build a challenge. 86 Issues of public
policy and common law claims that address inherent fairness in contracts
will continue to be at the forefront of arbitration disputes in the future.

80. In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d at 973, 974.
81. PacifiCareHealth Sys., Inc., 123 S. Ct. at 1535-36. The Court stated, "'mere speculation
that the foreign arbitrators might apply Japanese law which.., might reduce respondents' legal
obligations, does not in and of itself lessen liability...' nor did it provide an adequate basis upon
which to declare the relevant arbitration agreement unenforceable." Id. at 1534 (citing Vimar
Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/N Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541 (1995)). "[T]he proper course is
to compel arbitration." Id. at 1536.
82. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991) (citing Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Contr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
83. Id. at 30 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481
(1989)).
84. Id. at 26 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem '1Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24).
85. Arbitration agreements are unenforceable "only if Congress has evinced an intention to
preclude waiver of a judicial forum for a particular statutory right, or if the agreement was procured
by fraud or use of excessive economic power." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d
195, 196-97 (4th Cir. 1990).
86. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2003); Geiger
v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 2d 985, 999 (S.D. Ind. 2001); Cheek v. United
Healthcare of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc., No. 141, 2003 WL 22669518, *12 (Md. Ct. App. Nov. 13,
2003) (holding an employment arbitration agreement unenforceable for lack of consideration, where
employer reserved the right to alter, amend, modify or revoke the arbitration agreement at any time
and without prior notice).
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III. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")8 7 was
passed for several reasons, including: (1) to more effectively integrate
people with disabilities into society in order to countervail the isolation
of disabled persons, (2) to enable people with disabilities to become
more economically independent, and (3) to allow people with disabilities
to contribute to their overall economic prosperity. 88 The nondiscrimination standard imposed by the ADA is one of "reasonable
accommodation." 89 The reasonable accommodation standard varies by
the ability of the facility employing the individual with a disability to
pay for the costs of the accommodation; 90 the obligation to
accommodate the disability is limited by "undue hardship." 9 1 Early ADA
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2001).
88. See id. § 12101(a)(7); see also Ken Matheny, Guest Writers: Cleveland v. Policy
Management Systems Corp. andthe Need for a Consistent DisabilityPolicy, 21 HAMLINE J. PUB, L.
& POL'Y 283, 314 (2000) (explaining that "the ADA's goal [was to] encourage [] economic selfsufficiency and independent living for the disabled"). The ADA seemingly has had the effect of
shifting dependency costs related to disabilities from the public sector to the private sector.
89. The ADA defines "reasonable accommodation" as:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with
disabilities.
Id. § 12111(9)(A)-(B).
90. The ADA acknowledges that an employer has limited financial resources and therefore
allows such an employer to, "demonstrate that the [proposed] accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity .....
Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
(emphasis added).
91. The ADA defines "undue hardship" as, "an action requiring significant difficulty or
expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in paragraph (B)." Id. § 1211 1(10)(A).
These factors include:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of
the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the
effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon
the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business
of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and
location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition,
structure, and functions of the workplace of such entity; the geographic separateness,
administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered
entity.
Id. § 1211 (10)(B)(i)-(iv).
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cases clarified the definition of disability and many expanded the
employers' obligations. 92 More recently, however, cases are narrowing
and limiting the coverage of the ADA.
In Board of Trustees v. Garrett,93 the United States Supreme Court
held that pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, individuals do not have
the right to sue states in federal court for alleged violations of the
ADA. 9 4 The Court decided in Garrett that Congress had exceeded its
authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it allowed
state employees to bring damage actions against the state for violations
of the ADA. 95 In this 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court invoked the
Eleventh Amendment to bar state employees from recovering damages
from state employers who failed to comply with ADA regulations.9 6 The
Garrett decision followed on the heels of Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents, a case decided during the prior term, also by a 5-4 vote, holding
that the ADEA does not apply to state employers.97 In Kimel, the Court
rejected a disparate impact theory of discrimination when Florida State
University failed to make market-based adjustments to the salaries of
eligible employees.98 Furthermore, in Alexander v. Sandoval,9 9 the
United States Supreme Court decided by a 5-4 vote that there100is no
private right of action under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
92. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641, 655 (1998) (ruling that HIV-positive
individuals are disabled under the meaning of the ADA). But see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442, 446-47 (1985) (holding that mental retardation was not a quasi
or suspect classification under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and that a
"rational basis" test to determine the constitutionality of state regulation applies to state
classifications of mentally retarded individuals).
93. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
94. Id. at 360, 363. Although Congress extended application of the ADA to employees of
state and local governments, as well as private employers with fifteen or more employees, "in order
to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States, there must be a
pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy
imposed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to the targeted violation." Id. at 374.
95. Id. at 374.
96. Id. at 360. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id. at 363 (quoting the U.S. CONST.
amend XI).
97. Kimel, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000).
98. Id. at 70. Disparate impact discrimination occurs when a "facially neutral" employment
practice causes an adverse impact on a protected class. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,
487 U.S. 977, 985-87 (1988).
99. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
100. Id. at 277, 293. Title VI prohibits racial discrimination in any education program funded
by federal financing. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2000). However, in contrast to Garrett,
Kimel, and Alexander, the Supreme Court found that Nevada attempted to limit the applicability of
the FMLA to states, holding that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits individuals to sue
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In Toyota Motor Manufacturing,Inc. v. Williams, 10 ' a unanimous
United States Supreme Court ruled on the definition of disability
applicable to the ADA. 0 2 The touchstone of disability is whether the
individual suffers a substantial impairment in a major. life activity. 10 3 In
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, the individual seeking accommodations
10 4
suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome, caused by repetitive tasks.
However, the Court decided that the employee was not entitled to
accommodations at work because her carpal tunnel syndrome did not
impair her ability to perform ordinary daily functions. 0 5 Toyota Motor
Manufacturing follows on the heels of a trilogy of cases decided in
1999, all of which determined that an individual whose physical
could be corrected was not disabled under the meaning of
impairment
1 6
the ADA.'
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal'0 7 a unanimous United States
Supreme Court ruled that an employer can deny a job to a disabled
employee if the employer reasonably believes that performing the job
would impair the employee's personal health.'0 8 The Chevron U.S.A.
decision contrasts with International Union, United Automobile,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers v. Johnson Controls,
Inc.,"' 9 in which the Court held that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act prohibits employers from barring women of childbearing age from
jobs which pose a threat of harm to their fetuses, based on OSHA
standards." 0 Chevron U.S.A. is distinguishable from Johnson Controls
because it is based on an individualized risk of harm, whereas the
prohibition in Johnson Controls applied only to women of childbearing
age, unless the individual woman could prove that she was unable to
bear children. "'1

their state employer in federal court for damages if the state violates the FMLA. Nevada Dep't of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1976-77 (2003).
101. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
102. Id. at 186, 187.
103. Id. at 187.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 202.
106. See Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999); Murphy v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 520, 525 (1999), Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,
483 (1999).
107. 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
108. Id. at 75, 78, 86.
109. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
110. Id. at 211.
111. Chevron, Inc., 536 U.S. at 85-86; Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. at 211.
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In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett,1 1 2 a divided United States Supreme

Court decided that a disabled employee's right to "reasonable
accommodation" ordinarily cannot trump the employer's seniority
system for assigning jobs.' 13 Finally, in Barnes v. Gorman, 114 the United
States Supreme Court unanimously ruled that punitive damages cannot
be awarded under Title II of the ADA or its predecessor Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.'15
Overall, the thrust of United States Supreme Court's decisions in
recent terms with respect to the ADA has been to limit its scope, as well
as the remedies available under it.'1

6

Individuals are limited in that they

are typically not permitted to sue their state employers in federal court
for ADA violations, and the definition of a person with a disability has
been narrowly interpreted to exclude those whose impairments can be
corrected.
IV. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
In June 2003, the United States Supreme Court decided the
constitutionality of affirmative action programs regarding the admission
of students to institutions of higher education. 1 7 Two remarkably similar
cases with conflicting results between two courts," 8 as well as the
twenty-four year old Regents of the University of California v. Bakke
case, 119 provide the context in which the United States Supreme Court

112. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
113. Id. at 393, 405-06. See Int'l Bhd of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 352-54
(1977) (reconciling seniority rules with the 1964 Civil Rights Act and addressing whether the union
seniority system perpetuates the past effects of discrimination).
114. 536U.S. 181(2002).
115. Id. at 182, 185, 189. The Court reached its decision in Barnes by analogizing Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act to the application of Title II of the ADA.
116. Although the cases discussed above are more relevant to general employer-employee
relations, the Court decided in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001), that participation in
the Professional Golf Association Tour was governed by the public accommodations provisions of
Title III of the ADA, and that golfer Casey Martin was entitled to the use of a golf cart, as a
reasonable accommodation to his disability. Id. at 676-77, 681, 690.
117. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325,
2338 (2003).
118. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aff'd Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347;
Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'din
part and remanded by 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 929 (2001), overruled in
part by Grutter 123 S. Ct. 2325. However, since Hopwood was reversed in 1996, the Sixth Circuit
and the Fifth Circuit are now in accord. Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932, 962.
119. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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decided Grutter v. Bollinger'20 and Gratz v. Bollinger,'2' Grutter's
companion case.
Bakke arguably established diversity in student admissions as a
constitutionally permissible goal in higher education. 122 While the actual
procedures used by the University of California were prohibited as
violating constitutional standards,' 23 Justice Powell, writing for the
plurality of the Court, found that universities have an interest in creating
124 This interest, was found to be grounded in the
a diverse student body.
25
First Amendment. 1

Hopwood v. Texas challenged the constitutionality of procedures
for admission to the University of Texas Law School. 126 The University
of Texas Law School utilized a dual track system for admissions,
whereby a minority admissions subcommittee of the full admissions
committee evaluated minority students separately from non-minority
students. 27 This procedure was found by the trial court to serve a
compelling government interest under Bakke, but was unconstitutional
as a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the admissions procedures were not narrowly
tailored to meet the government's interest in diversity. 128 The Fifth
Circuit reversed the trial court's conclusion that diversity served as a
compelling government interest without reaching the issue of whether
the University of Texas Law School's admissions procedures were
narrowly tailored. 129 The United States Supreme Court refused to grant
120. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2335-36.
121. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2428.
122. Bakke, 438U.Sat311-12.
123. Id. at 319-20.
124. Id. at 312-13.
125. Id.
The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a diverse student body. This
clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education.
Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has
been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university
to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body....
The atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation'-so essential to the quality of
higher education-is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body.
Id. at 311-12 (footnote omitted). The United States Supreme Court has since "endorse[d] Justice
Powell's view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of
race in university admissions." Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2337.
126. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 554 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.
1996), rev'd in part and remanded by 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 929

(2001), overruledin partby Grutter 123 S. Ct. 2325.
127. Id. at 558, 559, 560, 562.
128. Id. at 579, 582.
129. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 945-46, 948, 955, 962 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd in partand
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130
certiorari in the Hopwood case.
In the aftermath of the Hopwood case, many universities stopped
considering race in admissions.1 31 California even passed a referendum,
Proposition 209,132 prohibiting the consideration of race. As a result,
minority admissions have dropped dramatically in California and
elsewhere where race is not a factor in admissions. 133
The University of Michigan developed and used an admission
procedure that included the consideration of race as a factor in admission
of students to the Law School. 134 Its procedures, however, were different
from those utilized at the University of Texas Law School and purported
to follow the Harvard Plan, which Justice Powell approved of in Bakke.
The University of Michigan Law School considered race as a "plus"
factor in admissions, without separate tracks or scoring systems for
by
minority students. 35 Nevertheless, these procedures were challenged
136
School.
Law
the
to
admission
non-minority students denied
The trial court decided that the University of Michigan violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by its consideration of race in admission to the

remanded by 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 929 (2001), overruled in part by
Grutter 123 S. Ct. 2325.
130. Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996); Texas v. Hopwood, 533 U.S. 929 (2001).
131. See CHILLING ADMISSIONS: THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CRISIS AND THE SEARCH FOR
ALTERNATIVES 68 (Gary Orfield & Edward Miller eds., 1998).
132. Proposition 209 was approved on November 1996 and amended the California State
Constitution: "The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any
individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of
public employment, public education, or public contracting." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31. For cases
holding that Proposition 209 is constitutionally sound, see Coalition for Econ. Equal. v. Wilson, 122
F. 3d 692, 711 (9th Cit. 1997) and Hi-Voltage Wire Works Inc. v. City of San Jose, 12 P.3d 1068,
1088 (Cal. 2000).
133. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 840 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (stating that
members of minority groups are granted preference because these minorities "would not be
admitted in significant numbers unless race is explicitly considered."), cert. granted in part 537
U.S. 1044 (2002), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aff'd 123 S. Ct. 2325
(2003). For commentary on this topic, see Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal
Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law
School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1997) (hypothesizing that abandoning
consideration of race would result in "a substantial reduction in the overall number of applicants of
color who [would be] offered admission into ABA-approved law schools"); Jesse Jackson, No Time
to Alter Affirmative Action, CHI. SUN TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at 25 (noting that according to the
University of Michigan, "only about 3 percent of black students would be admitted if determination
were left solely to grades and test scores").
134. See Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 827.
135. See Grutter,288 F.3d at 746.
136. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 823-24; see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 814
(E.D. Mich. 2000), revd in part, remandedby 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
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Law School. 137 However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically
relied on the Bakke case to overrule the trial court, holding that the
means used to meet the state's compelling interest in achieving student
body diversity were narrowly tailored.138
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Grutter v.
Bollinger to resolve the question of whether diversity is a
constitutionally permissible basis for the consideration of race in the
admission of students to public universities. 139 The standard for
constitutional inquiry became strict scrutiny following the Adarand v.
Pena case.1 40 The writ of certiorari
also presented the opportunity for re41
evaluating the Bakke case.1
Diversity, a constitutionally based interest that is grounded in the
First Amendment, has been found to be a compelling government
interest in prior cases, 142 such as Bakke 143 and Metro Broadcasting v.
FCC.14 4 This view holds that the range of views expressed in a
university (resonating in the marketplace of ideas) is broadened by the
inclusion of individuals with varied characteristics, backgrounds and
experiences. Thus, a constitutionally based interest grounded in the First
Amendment might supply the compelling government interest required
under an Adarand analysis of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment145 in an admission procedure that considers race
137. Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 853.
138. Grutter, 288 F.3d at 749 (opposing the "district court's consideration of five factors not
found in Bakke" and stating that the factors "relied on by the district court cannot sustain its
holding").
139. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2335 (2003).
140. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 229 (1995).
141. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2335-36.
142. See Paula Alexander Becker, Affirmative Action and Reverse Discrimination: Does
Taxman v. Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway Define the Outer Limits of Lawful
Voluntary Race-Conscious Affirmative Action?, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J., 13, 33-39 (1997).
143. Regents of the Univ. ofCalifornia v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-13 (1978).
144. 497 U.S. 547, 600 (1990), rev'd on other grounds; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. The Court
in Adarand stated:
What truly distinguishes Metro Broadcasting from our other affirmative action
precedents is the distinctive goal of the federal program in that case. Instead of merely
seeking to remedy past discrimination, the FCC program was intended to achieve future
benefits in the form of broadcast diversity. Reliance on race as a legitimate means of
achieving diversity

was first endorsed by Justice Powell

in ...

Bakke ....

The

proposition that fostering diversity may provide a sufficient interest to justify such a
program is not inconsistent with the Court's holding today-indeed, the question is not
remotely presented in this case-and I do not take the Court's opinion to diminish that
aspect of our decision in Metro Broadcasting.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 257-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (first emphasis added).
145. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
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or other ascriptive characteristics of the individual. Courts would then
determine, under the specific facts of a case, how to reconcile the two
constitutionally based interests underlying the controversy, and whether
the admissions procedures are narrowly tailored to meet the asserted
Fourteenth Amendment interests implicated in the admissions
procedures. 146 This fact sensitive inquiry into narrow tailoring allowed
the Supreme Court to affirm both the Hopwood and Grutter Appellate
Courts.147

The United States Supreme Court holding in Grutter provides
additional insight into affirmative action, wherein the Court decided,
using a strict scrutiny standard of review, that student body diversity in
public higher education is a compelling government interest. 148 It also
decided in Grutter that the means used to achieve that interest were
narrowly tailored.' 49 However, the means used by the University for
admission to the undergraduate College of Literature, Science and Art
failed to pass constitutional muster, because they were not narrowly
tailored.' 50 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, "endorse[d]
Justice Powell's view that student body diversity is a compelling state
interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions."'15' The
Grutter case rejects the rule that "remedying past discrimination is the
52
only permissible justification for race-based governmental action.'
Ultimately, the use of race in admissions decisions must be narrowly
tailored to achieve a permissible government interest. In Grutter, the
Court found that the law school admission procedure, which considered
race a "plus" factor, required individualized review of each applicant's
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
146. Strict scrutiny requires not only a compelling government interest, but also narrow
tailoring to meet the compelling interest. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
147. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948 (5th Cir. 1996); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2325, 2328 (2003).
148. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2328, 2329, 2337.
149. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2347.
150. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2427-28 (2003).
151. Grutter,123 S. Ct. at 2337.
152. Id. at 2338-39. This may have far-reaching implications in other contexts, particularly
because, as Justice O'Connor notes, leadership of the American military and of American
businesses, which is fostered in significant ways by institutions of higher education, requires "skills
needed in today's increasingly global marketplace [that] can only be developed through exposure to
widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints." Id. at 2340.
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profile, and which required individuals to compete with each other for
all open seats in a given class, passed constitutional muster.153 However,
the procedures for admission to the undergraduate college 54 were found
unconstitutional where the school used a selection index that granted
twenty points, of the required one hundred points to guarantee
admission, to all minority applicants. 155 The United States Supreme
Court found that the undergraduate college procedures were5 6 "not
narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational diversity."'
V. CONCLUSION

As previously discussed, recent Supreme Court decisions have
significantly affected the respective rights and responsibilities of
employers and employees. Employer policies requiring arbitration of
employment disputes have been affirmed by several Supreme Court
cases. The reach of the ADA, as well as the remedies available to
claimants under the ADA, have been limited by the Supreme Court.
Recent decisions have also limited the scope of the ADEA and Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act. In the Spring of 2003, the United States
Supreme Court determined that the Family Medical Leave Act applies to
states, through Congress' valid exercise of its power granted to it under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court also
decided in June of 2003 that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the
University of Michigan to consider race as a factor in the admission of
students because diversity can provide a compelling government interest
sufficient to meet the Fourteenth Amendment standard of equal
protection, provided that the method used in the admission of students is
narrowly tailored to meet the University's interest.
Employee access to arbitration of employment disputes, including
claims of discrimination and unjust dismissal, arguably enhances
employee job security. This provides a low-cost, expeditious forum for
the adjudication of such disputes, provided that the arbitration agreement
does not fail on grounds of unconscionability. Employers likewise
benefit from the use of arbitration, rather than litigation. The ADA has
153.

ld. at 2343.

154. These procedures were adopted in 1999. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2421. From 1995 through
1998, the undergraduate school used a different program, where it reserved seats for
underrepresented minority applicants, effectively keeping nonprotected applicants from competing
for those slots. Id.The District Court found that program to be unconstitutional under Bakke. Id.
155. Id. at 2427.
156. Gratz, 123 S.Ct. at 2427 (5-4 decision) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
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been narrowly interpreted to exclude state employers. Furthermore,
recent Supreme Court cases have constricted the coverage of the ADA
by limiting what qualifies as a disability under the meaning157of the Act.
Both trends follow a period of expansion of ADA coverage.
In 2003, the Supreme Court decided a pair of cases dealing with the
use of affirmative action as a factor for admission in higher education.
Although not directly involving the employment relationship, the
outcome of the Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger cases will
impact employer-employee relations because they clarified the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment and decided whether and to what extent the
consideration of race to promote diversity is a constitutionally
permissible goal. The extension of these cases to the employment arena
is a likely development of the law, particularly in view of Justice
O'Connor's reference to leadership skills required of individuals in our
present global environment. Thus, while employees have significant
statutory protection under the Civil Rights Act, the ADA, the FAA and
other employment related statutes and administrative regulations, recent
Supreme Court decisions on the whole have expanded management
prerogatives, upholding the use of arbitration as a condition of
employment, narrowing the scope and remedies available under the
ADA, and deciding that diversity can serve as a compelling government
interest supporting the consideration of race in the admission of students
to public institutions of higher education.
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